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‘Freedom is more important than 
health’: Thomas Szasz and the problem 
of paternalism
Joanna Moncrieff
When Thomas Szasz summed up his 
philosophical principles at the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists’ annual meeting in Edinburgh 
in 2010, he declared that ‘freedom is more 
important than health’. Psy chiatry is the arena 
in which the conflict between freedom and 
health comes most sharply into focus, according 
to Szasz. This paper proposes some parallels 
with medicine in low-income countries for 
pointers towards a resolution of this conflict. 
When Thomas Szasz summed up his philosophi-
cal principles at the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ 
annual meeting in Edinburgh in 2010, he declared 
that ‘freedom is more important than health’. This 
view was nurtured by his experience of fleeing 
the Nazis in the 1930s, and his eventual arrival in 
the USA, the land of the free. For the whole of his 
career Szasz maintained that fostering the ability 
of individuals to make their own choices was the 
most important principle of a modern society, ‘a 
society in which man has a chance, however small, 
to develop his own powers and to become an 
individual’ (Szasz, 1988, p. 128). He opposed pro-
hibitions on the use of any class of drug, restrictions 
designed to prevent suicide and anything that he 
perceived as state interference in the private lives 
and actions of individuals. 
The importance Szasz placed on freedom was 
associated with a concern for human dignity, and a 
belief that dignity comes from the ability to live an 
independent, self-determined life, free of control 
and potential humiliation at the hands of others. 
Since freedom (and responsibility) is the ‘crucial 
moral characteristic of the human condition’ 
(Szasz, 1988, p. xv), any circumstance that renders 
people dependent on others to make decisions for 
them automatically makes individuals less than 
fully human, and consequently reduces the dignity 
of human life. 
Sickness and infirmity involve dependency and 
hence a loss of dignity, but medical treatment also 
renders the ‘invalid’ dependent on the doctor or 
healer, and in this sense treatment is also inher-
ently undignified. In this position Szasz is close 
to Ivan Illich, and the thesis set out in the latter’s 
classic book, Medical Nemesis, that the dependency-
inducing effects of modern medicine have depleted 
the natural resources of human beings to endure 
and combat suffering. Rather than enhancing life, 
medicine has, in this view, diminished humanity as 
a whole (Illich, 1976). 
When people are very sick, they may become 
incapable of making informed and thoughtful de-
cisions about what they want to be done. In this 
situation, relatives, friends, carers and doctors 
have to make judgements on the patient’s behalf. 
The idea that people can make judgements that 
are solely in another person’s best interests is what 
we call ‘paternalism’. Szasz, among others, was 
perennially suspicious of paternalism, seeing it as 
an evil to be avoided if possible and quoting Kant, 
who said ‘nobody may compel me to be happy in 
his own way. Paternalism is the greatest despotism 
imaginable’ (cited in Szasz, 1990, p. 39). 
As well as infringing the autonomy of the in-
dividual, paternalism is dangerous, according 
to Szasz, because it disguises the fact that other 
motivations are always at stake. No decision about 
how to treat another human being is ever truly 
neutral or objective. In medical situations, there 
are always interests other than the patient’s that 
intrude, whether this be the interests of the family, 
the doctor or the community or organisation the 
doctor represents. The idea of paternalism only 
obfuscates these other influences (Szasz, 1988). 
It has been argued, however, that freedom is a 
preoccupation of those who are already healthy, 
wealthy and secure. Where daily existence remains 
a struggle, the self-determination of each indi-
vidual may seem relatively unimportant. The 
French philosopher Georges Canguilhem cited the 
surgeon René Leriche when he described health as 
the ‘silence of the organs’ and drew attention to 
the fact that the impact of disease and infirmity is 
often not appreciated when good health is taken 
for granted (Canguilhem, 2012). In some low- 
and middle-income countries, as in the ghettos of 
Western cities, where freedom means the freedom 
to scratch a living from the margins of afflu-
ent society, its loss may not be greatly mourned. 
Moreover, the health problems that continue to 
beset much of Africa for example – malnutrition 
and infectious disease – are significantly reduced 
by simple procedures such as improved sanitation, 
nutrition, immunisation and the administration 
of antibiotics that involve little loss of dignity. 
The health benefits that accrue help to increase 
individuals’ capacity to lead autonomous and in-
dependent lives. 
Even in high-income countries, freedom is 
sometimes subordinated to the general health of 
the populace. In the USA, for example, vaccina-
tion of children is mandated because the immunity 
of society in general is prioritised over the choice 
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of individual families. Similarly, many countries, 
including the UK, have public health laws that 
contain measures to enforce treatment of tuber-
culosis, including the forcible confinement of an 
infected individual if this is thought necessary. 
Although Szasz may have acknowledged that a 
self-aware paternalism was necessary in the care 
of people who are seriously physically sick, he was 
critical of the extension of the paternalistic prin-
ciple to other areas of life, including psychiatry. In 
fact, Szasz argued that the reason for constructing 
certain forms of behaviour as illness is precisely in 
order to justify managing them in a paternalistic 
fashion. Famously, for Szasz ‘mental illness’ is not 
the same sort of entity as a bodily illness or disease, 
and can be rightly understood as an illness only 
in a metaphorical sense. The metaphor has been 
mistaken for reality because of the social functions 
it serves, one of which is to provide a convenient 
mechanism for the management of socially disrup-
tive and unpredictable behaviour. 
The purpose of the concept of mental illness in 
this account is thus ‘to disguise and render more 
palatable the bitter pill of moral conflict in human 
relations’ (Szasz, 1970, p. 24). Defining such situa-
tions as the illness of a particular individual enables 
the freedom of that individual to be curtailed and 
interventions to adjust unwanted behaviour to 
be represented as ‘treatment’. In other words, an 
individual can be subjected to the will of others, 
including being removed from society, confined 
in an institution and forced to take mind-altering 
substances, but these actions can be construed as 
being in the individual’s ‘best interests’. So psy-
chiatry is the arena in which the conflict between 
freedom and health comes most sharply into focus, 
but it is also an artificial conflict, according to 
Szasz. The language of health and illness is only 
a gloss that is applied to the daily struggles that 
occur between people who want to behave in a 
certain way, and those who want them to behave 
otherwise. 
Mental health problems do not need to be 
conceived of as illnesses in order to justify pater-
nalistic intervention, however. Although ultimately 
rejected by the British government, the notion of 
basing mental health legislation on the concept 
of ‘capacity’ has been proposed by various com-
mentators, including the government-appointed 
Richardson committee in 1999 (Department of 
Health, 1999). Under these proposals, intervention 
that was judged to be in an individual’s ‘best in-
terests’ could be justified when that individual was 
deemed to have lost the capacity to make rational 
decisions, whether the loss of capacity was occa-
sioned by a bona fide brain disease or an episode 
of mental disturbance that would be diagnosed as 
a mental disorder of some kind. 
Reservations about paternalism apply regard-
less of how mental disorder is conceptualised, and 
judgements about the nature of ‘incapacity’ and 
what really constitutes the individual’s ‘best inter-
ests’ are always going to be subjective. Removing 
the link with illness might make the nature and 
purpose of coercive interventions in psychiatry 
more apparent, however. 
Szasz felt that individuals should not be forced 
to receive an intervention they do not want, even 
if their life without such an intervention appears 
to be squalid, limited, unrewarding and uncom-
fortable. In contrast to physical medicine, where 
paternalism might sometimes be a necessary evil, 
in psychiatry it is unacceptable, because it denies 
human beings the dignity of making their own 
choices, however unwise or self-destructive those 
choices might sometimes seem to be. Reflecting 
on Canguilhem’s insights, however, suggests that, 
although from the point of view of sanity it may 
be possible to value the dignity of human freedom 
above the ability to function in the actual world, 
someone has to have a basic level of rational 
 capacity in order to make that judgement. When 
this is impaired, then a paternalistic approach that 
aims to restore that capacity could be seen as sup-
porting human dignity and autonomy, rather than 
depleting them. 
Psychiatrists who work with people who are 
 severely mentally ill face these dilemmas daily. 
Do they leave patients who are deeply psychotic 
to themselves, allowing them to sink into a state 
of extreme apathy and internal preoccupation, or 
do they force them to take antipsychotic medica-
tion that might restore some degree of contact 
with the external world? Similarly, do they attempt 
to engage such individuals in some social inter-
action that, initially at least, they might resist, in 
order to try and establish what appears to be a 
more rewarding and socially engaged life? If all 
 patients woke up from their psychosis and thanked 
their psychiatrists for restoring them to sanity, 
the quandary would not exist. But most do not. 
Many people who are forced to receive psychiatric 
treatment, such as antipsychotic drugs, against 
their wishes either feel they have not benefited, 
or that the benefits do not outweigh the negative 
impact of the treatment. Although symptoms may 
be reduced, some people feel that an important 
aspect of their personality has been lost too, and 
that their mental life has become more limited. 
One patient summed up the dilemma like this: ‘In 
losing my periods of madness, I have had to pay 
with my soul’ (Wescott, 1979, p. 989). 
Using forced treatment to increase autonomy in 
mental health services is thus fraught with diffi-
culties. It is impossible to predict reliably who is 
likely to appreciate the effects of treatment and 
who might feel diminished by them. Again, a 
para l lel with medicine in low- and middle-income 
 countries might provide pointers to a solution. 
Although the benefits of simple health meas-
ures such as improved sanitation appear obvious, 
they may still be resented and resisted if they are 
imposed from outside. Only when healthcare is 
designed and implemented by the community 
itself will it be able to foster the development of 
capable and autonomous individuals. In a similar 
way, society as a whole needs to take respon-
sibility for the things we do to people who are 
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designated as having mental disorders. There 
needs to be a transparent debate about when it is 
justifiable to subject someone to forcible confine-
ment and mind-altering interventions. Crucially, 
the verdicts of people who have experienced 
such measures need to be heard. As Szasz identi-
fied, however, this is unlikely to happen as long 
as these conditions are defined as medical illness 
and intervention as ‘medical treatment’. A system 
is possible, however, which reduces the gap that 
sometimes exists between freedom and sanity. 
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